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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 A primary focus of American grand strategy in foreign affairs is to 
promote democratic, prosperous societies that are inhospitable to po-
litical extremism.1 At the same time, the United States regularly 
sends unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, or “drones”) to kill suspected 
terrorists in multiple countries2 and strictly enforces a statutory pro-
hibition against providing terrorists with “material support.”3 In the-
ory, these two approaches—one preventative and one reactive—
should complement each other in the service of widely shared global 
interests. In practice, however, the increasingly dominant role of re-
active, zero-tolerance antiterrorism policies is both crowding out pre-
ventative American public diplomacy and expanding the scope of the 
executive branch‟s national security authority. 
 President Barack Obama kept his campaign promises to refocus 
American military power on al-Qaeda after the wars in Afghanistan 
                                                                                                                  
 * J.D. 2014, magna cum laude, Florida State University College of Law. I would like 
to thank Professor Fernando Tesón for his invaluable critiques of early drafts. This Com-
ment also could not have been completed without the unconditional support of John Light-
le, Susan Lightle, and my parents, Corinne and Steve Moore.   
 1. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 4-5 (2010), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
 2. See Jonathan Masters, Targeted Killings, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (last updated 
May 23, 2013), www.cfr.org/counterterrorism/targeted-killings/p9627. 
 3. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
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and Iraq, but he has not rejected the “unchecked presidential power” 
for which he criticized his predecessor.4 Despite the ambiguous legal 
basis of targeted killing and its inevitable collateral damage, the 
Obama Administration has standardized the use of aerial drone 
strikes and dramatically increased the number of countries in which 
they occur.5 Meanwhile, executive agencies have interpreted the ma-
terial support statutes so broadly that ordinary civilians and estab-
lished charities are easily tainted by incidental interactions with 
such groups.6 Both drone strikes and the material support prohibi-
tions share a failure to adequately distinguish terrorists from the 
communities in which they live and operate. 
 This Comment advances the premise that, when paired with the 
President‟s political incentives, the executive‟s constitutional duty to 
defend the United States from attack inevitably leads to an over-
broad conception of self-defense and a maximalist approach to execu-
tive power. In a government of checks and balances, the correspond-
ing duty of the other two branches is to prevent that result. But alt-
hough Congress has explicit constitutional war powers and has ex-
pressed some intent to exercise them, the special threat of terrorism 
has inspired extreme legislative deference to the Commander-in-
Chief. The judiciary, for its own part, has consistently denied its au-
thority to properly balance national security interests against indi-
vidual civil liberties.7 Evidence is mounting that this double defer-
ence is undermining the rule of law and harming long-term foreign 
policy objectives. 
 Instead of relying on executive restraint or stricter judicial review 
in this area, I suggest that those of us who are troubled by these 
trends must look primarily to Congress to reverse them. The legisla-
ture has clear constitutional authority to regulate the use of military 
force, to define the limits of military counterterrorism operations and 
set other foreign policy objectives, and to give courts better statutory 
parameters to increase their respective oversight of the executive in 
its pursuit of national security. Part II lays out the basic legal 
framework for initiating U.S. military action, tracing the roots of def-
erence to the executive and describing current antiterrorism policies. 
Part III surveys some key consequences of antiterrorism absolutism 
and unchecked executive power for both domestic and foreign affairs. 
Finally, Part IV proposes that Congress should begin to assert its 
                                                                                                                  
 4. See Senator Barack Obama, Address at the Woodrow Wilson International Center 
for Scholars: National Security (Aug. 1, 2007), available at http://www.cfr.org/elections/ 
obamas-speech-woodrow-wilson-center/p13974. 
 5. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 6. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 7. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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check on national security policy by revisiting three statutes: the 
outdated Authorization for Use of Military Force,8 the prohibition on 
providing material support to terrorist groups,9 and the Foreign As-
sistance Act.10 Amending these laws would give the legislature more 
opportunities to balance executive power and develop better and 
more accountable policies. 
II.   THE BALANCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITY 
 Constitutional provisions relating to the use of military force offer 
minimal guidance as to the appropriate interbranch balance of pow-
er. This section contrasts the vague constitutional promise of a con-
gressional check with the reality of its inadequacy, particularly for 
executive action where the threat of terrorism is apparent. It con-
cludes that U.S. Presidents‟ expansive interpretations of executive 
war powers—including those of President Obama—should not be at 
all surprising, given the executive‟s vague legal parameters, political 
incentives, and lack of effective oversight. 
A.   Constitutional Powers 
 1.   Text and Early Debates 
 When the delegates to the 1787 Constitutional Convention gath-
ered in Philadelphia, the vesting of war-making authority outside of 
a sovereign executive was unprecedented; yet the drafters struggled 
to limit the American executive‟s ability to deploy military force.11 
The only constitutional provision explicitly granting such authority is 
Article II, section 2, which makes the President “the Commander-in-
Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States . . . .”12 Article II 
also gives the President influence over other foreign policy matters, 
such as the power to “receive [foreign] Ambassadors”13 and to make 
treaties and appoint American ambassadors, with the advice and 
consent of the Senate.14 Finally, the executive must “take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”15 
                                                                                                                  
 8. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012). 
 9. 18 U.S. C. § 2339A (2012). 
 10. 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (2012). 
 11. Many were fearful of an executive with control of a standing army. See, e.g., THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 26 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 12. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2. 
 13. Id. § 3. 
 14. Id. § 2, cl. 2. 
 15. Id. § 3.  
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 In contrast to Article II‟s unconditional grant of executive power, 
Article I limits congressional authority to the “legislative Powers 
herein granted.”16 However, the powers enumerated in section 8 es-
tablish broad legislative control over military and foreign policy. 
Congress has the authority to “declare War, grant Letters of Marque 
and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Wa-
ter.”17 It can also “raise and support Armies,” provided that “no Ap-
propriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two 
Years;” similarly, it can “provide and maintain a Navy.”18 Related 
powers include: “To make Rules for the Government and Regulation 
of the land and naval Forces; To provide for calling forth the Militia 
to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions; [and] To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, 
the Militia.”19 Section 8 also establishes significant legislative control 
over U.S. monetary policy and gives Congress the power “[t]o define 
and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and 
Offences against the Law of Nations.”20 Finally, Congress can “make 
all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Exe-
cution” its other powers.21 
 The inevitable tension between the legislative power to “declare 
war” and the executive‟s commander-in-chief power emerged early, 
when President Washington unilaterally declared American neutrali-
ty in the French Revolutionary Wars.22  James Madison protested 
that inherent in Congress‟s authority to declare war was the inverse 
power to declare that the United States was not at war, that is, that 
the United States was neutral.23 But Alexander Hamilton defended 
Washington‟s declaration, invoking the unconditional and broadly 
defined vesting language of Article II.24 Congress quickly mooted the 
                                                                                                                  
 16. Id. § 1.  
 17. Id. § 8, cl. 11. The drafters at the Constitutional Convention argued as to whether 
Congress should have the power to “make” war or merely “declare” it, settling on the latter 
to avoid infringing on the Commander-in-Chief‟s authority. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 318-19 (M. Farrand ed., 1911). 
 18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-13.  
 19. Id. cl. 14-16.  
 20. Id. cl. 10.  
 21. Id. cl. 18.  
 22. See 32 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 430-31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 
1939). Then Chief Justice John Jay refused to advise the President on the legality of his 
action. Although many praise this decision as a key foundation of an independent judiciary, 
the incident also marks the beginning of the courts‟ long tradition of avoiding questions 
related to foreign affairs and military policy in particular. Id. 
 23. See James Madison, Helvidius No. 1, (Aug. 24, 1793), reprinted in 15 PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON 66, 66-73 (Thomas A. Mason et al. eds., 1985). 
 24. See Alexander Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1, (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 PAPERS 
OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 33, 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1969). 
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controversy by passing its own declaration of neutrality,25 but the ep-
isode revealed a deep and persistent uncertainty about the scope of 
executive power under Article II. 
 2.   Judicial Deference to the Executive 
 Over the past century, the Supreme Court has effectively validat-
ed the Hamiltonian view of executive power. In its precedential anal-
ysis in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Court con-
sidered whether a Joint Resolution of Congress was sufficient to pro-
hibit weapons sales to certain foreign countries if the President had 
withdrawn a proclamation to the same effect.26 The Court first dis-
tinguished the federal government‟s “external” powers from its do-
mestic powers: while federal authority over American citizens had 
been delegated by the states, its foreign relations power had been in-
herited from the previous sovereign, Great Britain.27 Bracketing for-
eign relations authority in this way, the Court reasoned that such 
inherited authority was largely vested in the President: 
[P]articipation in the exercise of the power is significantly limited. 
In this vast external realm, . . . the President alone has the power 
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. . . . [H]e alone 
negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; 
and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in 
his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of Representa-
tives, “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”28 
Citing a Senate Foreign Relations Committee report from 1816 that 
advocated presidential dominance in foreign relations, the Court fur-
ther decided that the President‟s power in this area “does not require 
as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.”29 Justice Sutherland‟s 
opinion in Curtiss-Wright emphasized the pragmatic need for unity of 
national representation in foreign relations and the President‟s supe-
rior informational resources.30 
 The Curtiss-Wright analysis has been subject to thorough eviscer-
ation in the academy, with respect to both its extra-constitutional 
theory of federal foreign relations power and its expansive conception 
                                                                                                                  
 25. See Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 50, 1 Stat. 381. 
 26. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
 27. Id. at 316. 
 28. Id. at 319. 
 29. Id. at 320. 
 30. Id. 
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of executive authority in that field.31 Nevertheless, courts still cite the 
decision whenever they defer to the executive in matters of foreign 
policy—which is to say, frequently.32 Even though Justice Suther-
land‟s theory of executive dominance was dicta, other cases quickly 
reinforced it. Five months after Curtiss-Wright, Justice Sutherland 
expanded on the theory of executive dominance in United States v. 
Belmont, in which the Court held that “executive agreements”—
negotiated with foreign entities without legislative approval—carry 
the same legal weight as Senate-approved treaties under the law.33 
Later, in United States v. Pink, the Court held that the President‟s 
constitutional authority to negotiate treaties, and the need for credi-
bility in such interactions, justified the executive‟s power to unilater-
ally make foreign policy.34 G. Edward White sees Curtiss-Wright‟s con-
clusions about executive power as a tipping point in what had been an 
“incremental” expansion of the President‟s authority.35 
 In 1952, the Court temporarily halted the legal expansion of exec-
utive power with its decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Saw-
yer.36 The case arose from President Harry Truman‟s Executive Order 
to seize steel mills, which were incapacitated by a labor strike, to 
maintain U.S. steel production.37 Premising its decision on the then-
ongoing Korean War, the Truman Administration argued that the 
seizure served the interests of national security and was authorized 
by the executive‟s commander-in-chief and implied emergency pow-
ers.38 The Court rejected the seizure‟s constitutional legitimacy, ex-
pressing profound discomfort with the appropriation of private prop-
erty in the name of national security.39 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice Black summarily concluded that the seizure was a legislative ac-
tion; and as such, it was unavailable to the executive, even in times 
                                                                                                                  
 31. See, e.g., David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Jus-
tice Sutherland‘s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 494 (1946) (arguing that Curtiss-Wright‟s his-
torical argument for an extra-constitutional foreign relations power was unfounded); G. 
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 
VA. L. REV. 1, 98-110 (1999) (calling the Curtiss-Wright decision revisionist and radical due 
to its abandonment of constitutional limits). 
 32. Anthony Simones, The Reality of Curtiss-Wright, 16 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 411, 419 (1996). 
 33. 301 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1937). 
 34. 315 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1942). 
 35. White, supra note 31, at 146. 
 36. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 37. Id. at 582-83. 
 38. Id. at 583-84. President Truman immediately reported his action to Congress and 
sent another report twelve days later. After Congress did not respond, steel producers chal-
lenged the seizure in federal court. Id. 
 39. Id. at 587. 
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of war or emergency.40 However, the complexity of the question in-
spired five concurrences, including one by Justice Jackson that even-
tually became the controlling opinion of the case.41 
 Justice Jackson thought that legitimate executive action could be 
conceptually organized around congressional approval, or lack there-
of.42 When the President acts with the “express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress,” Justice Jackson wrote, “his authority is at its max-
imum.”43 When the President acts against the will of Congress, he 
can rely only on his independent constitutional powers.44 Between 
these two extremes, 
there is a zone of twilight in which [the President] and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is un-
certain. Therefore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence 
may sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this area, 
any actual test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of 
events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law.45 
 Justice Jackson concluded that even though Congress was silent 
after President Truman‟s Order, its past history of strict regulation of 
private property seizures meant that the executive branch could only 
rely on its own constitutional authority for legitimacy in that case.46 
Justice Jackson took pains to encourage a “practical” assessment of 
the scope of the commander-in-chief power but emphasized the need 
to limit it: 
[J]ust what authority goes with the name has plagued Presidential 
advisers who would not waive or narrow it by nonassertion yet 
cannot say where it begins or ends. It undoubtedly puts the Na-
tion‟s armed forces under Presidential command. . . . But no doc-
trine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me more sin-
ister and alarming than that a President whose conduct of foreign 
affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is unknown, can 
vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs of the country 
by his own commitment of the Nation‟s armed forces to some for-
                                                                                                                  
 40. Id. at 588. 
 41. Id. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see Michael J. Turner, Comment, Fade to 
Black: The Formalization of Jackson‘s Youngstown Taxonomy by Hamdan and Medellin, 58 
AM. U. L. REV. 665, 674 (2009). 
 42. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 654. 
 43. Id. at 635. 
 44. Id. at 637. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 640. 
262  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:255 
 
eign venture. . . . He has no monopoly of “war powers,” whatever 
they are.47 
Justice Jackson was even less amenable to the government‟s implied 
emergency powers argument. The Framers, he wrote, 
knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender 
for authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pre-
text for usurpation. We may also suspect that they suspected 
that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergencies. Aside 
from suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in 
time of rebellion or invasion, when the public safety may require 
it, they made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary 
authority because of a crisis. I do not think we rightfully may so 
amend their work.48 
 Thus, Youngstown limited the scope of executive power and articu-
lated an enduring analytical framework that demanded consideration 
of legislative intent. However, its opinions repeatedly highlighted the 
domestic character of the steel mills and, therefore, ultimately pro-
vided little insight into the content and reach of executive power in 
true matters of foreign policy. Had the Court accepted the Truman 
Administration‟s framing of the seizures as a national security neces-
sity, Curtiss-Wright and its progeny indicate that the government‟s 
arguments would have inspired much more deference. 
 Tracing several cases through the twentieth century, Anthony 
Simones writes that 
[b]y the 1970s, the specific facts that gave rise to Curtiss-Wright 
faded from the memory of many judges who sought to use it as a 
precedent for presidential domination of national security af-
fairs. Largely forgotten was Justice Robert Jackson‟s reminder 
that Curtiss-Wright “involved, not the question of the President‟s 
power to act without congressional authority, but the question of 
his right to act under and in accord with an Act of Congress.”49 
Simones notes that no cases in this line seem to conceive of any limit 
on implied presidential powers in the realm of foreign relations,50 a 
trend which contrasts sharply with Justice Jackson‟s Youngstown 
concurrence.51 Thus, at least with respect to foreign affairs, the judi-
                                                                                                                  
 47. Id. at 641-42, 644. 
 48. Id. at 650. 
 49. Simones, supra note 32, at 419. 
 50. Id. 
 51. But see Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J.L. & POL. 1, 
64 (2000) (suggesting that Justice Jackson‟s three zones must be slightly reconceived in a 
national security context to account for the executive‟s increased discretion). 
2014]  BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 263 
 
ciary effectively resolved in Hamilton‟s favor the early debate about 
the scope of executive war powers by the time global terrorism be-
came a major security threat. 
 3.   The War Powers Resolution and Congressional Acquiescence 
 With little help from the judiciary, Congress struggled for influ-
ence over American use of force as military operations became less 
conventional during the Cold War. In 1950, President Truman sent 
U.S. troops to the Korean peninsula, pursuant to a United Nations 
Security Council Resolution, without seeking congressional approv-
al.52 He explained that this “police action” was an American obliga-
tion under the U.N. Charter.53 Many legislators disputed Truman‟s 
authority to commit U.S. troops to the Korean conflict, and Congress 
never explicitly approved American participation.54  
 The meaning of Congress‟ constitutional power to “declare” war 
was uncertain in the age of nuclear weapons, when such declarations 
became nonsensical. Did “declare” encompass authorizations for war, 
and if so, to what extent?55 Protracted U.S. military operations in Vi-
etnam raised the questions of whether implied authorization could be 
found in, for example, appropriation of funds for executive action,56 
                                                                                                                  
 52. See S.C. Res. 82, U.N. Doc. S/RES/82 (June 25, 1950). 
 53. See President Harry S. Truman, News Conference, Executive Office Building (June 
29, 1950), available at www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=806st=st1. Short-
ly after the Senate consented to the U.N. Charter, Congress passed the United Nations 
Participation Act of 1945, ch. 583, 59 Stat. 619 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 287 
(1949)), subjecting U.S. military commitments to the U.N. to legislative approval. 
 54. See Louis Fisher, The Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?, 89 AM. 
J. INT‟L L. 21 (1995). A legislative minority protested that the U.N. Participation Act re-
quired separate approval for each military agreement, that the Security Council had no 
authority to enforce military obligations, and that such military actions left the House of 
Representatives completely out of war-making decisions. The Department of Defense re-
ports 33,686 American battle deaths as a result of the Korean Conflict. See Kathleen T. 
Rehm, Korean War Death Stats Highlight Modern DoD Safety Record, U.S. DEP‟T OF DEF. 
NEWS, AM. FORCES PRESS SERV. (June 8, 2000), www.defense.gov/news/ 
newsarticle.aspx?id=45275. 
 55. Most scholars believe that an originalist constitutional analysis of the “declare 
war” power either yields a broad interpretation of legislative authority or is indeterminate. 
See, e.g., Matthew Fleischman, A Functional Distribution of War Powers, 13 N.Y.U. J. 
LEGIS. & PUB. POL‟Y 137 (2010); Harold Hongju Koh, Comment, The Coase Theorem and 
the War Power: A Response, 41 DUKE L.J. 122 (1991); Michael D. Ramsey, Text and History 
in the War Powers Debate: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1685 (2002); but see 
John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of 
War Powers, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 167 (1996). 
 56. See Orlando v. Laird, 443 F.2d 1039, 1043 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
869 (1971) (holding that Congress‟ appropriation of funds for the Vietnam Conflict consti-
tuted sufficient indication of its approval). In its power of the purse, Congress faces a polit-
ical dilemma: it has constitutional authority to express disapproval by withholding appro-
priations for military operations, but this measure potentially turns deployed U.S. service 
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and under what circumstances the executive could proceed even in 
the case of unequivocal legislative disapproval.57 
 The debacle of Vietnam led Congress to pass the War Powers Res-
olution of 1973 over presidential veto. The most assertive exercise of 
its constitutional war powers to date provides: 
(a) Congressional declaration. It is the purpose of this chapter to 
fulfill the intent of the framers of the Constitution of the United 
States and insure that the collective judgment of both the Con-
gress and the President will apply to the introduction of United 
States Armed Forces into hostilities, or into situations where im-
minent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the cir-
cumstances, and to the continued use of such forces in hostilities or 
in such situations.  
. . . . 
(c) Presidential executive power as Commander-in-Chief; limita-
tion. The constitutional powers of the President as Commander-in-
Chief to introduce United States Armed Forces into hostilities, or 
into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is clear-
ly indicated by the circumstances, are exercised only pursuant to 
(1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3) 
a national emergency created by attack upon the United States, its 
territories or possessions, or its armed forces.58 
The Resolution also requires the President to report to Congress 
within forty-eight hours upon introducing military forces to hostili-
ties without prior legislative approval.59 It also requires the President 
to remove those forces within sixty days, unless Congress specifically 
authorizes continued involvement.60 Finally, it explicitly rejects the 
use of American military force with no legal authorization other than 
an international treaty, even a treaty approved by the Senate.61 
 Despite these directives, the four decades following the Resolu-
tion‟s passage have proven the law to be toothless.62 No President has 
                                                                                                                  
members into hostages in a battle between the political branches‟ competing foreign policy 
objectives. 
 57. Id. at 1040. 
 58. 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012). 
 59. Id. § 1543(a)(3). 
 60. Id. § 1544(b). 
 61. Id. § 1547(a). 
 62. However, there is no shortage of academic suggestions for improving the Resolu-
tion. See, e.g., Geoffrey Corn, Triggering Congressional War Powers Notification: A Pro-
posal to Reconcile Constitutional Practice with Operational Reality, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 687, 692 (2010); Jonathan T. Menitove, Note, Once More Unto the Breach: American 
War Power and a Second Legislative Attempt to Ensure Congressional Input, 43 U. MICH. 
J.L. REFORM 773, 791 (2010). 
2014]  BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 265 
 
acknowledged the statute‟s validity or any obligation to comply with 
it. Its language essentially allows a President to make war for two 
months without legislative approval—a generous timeframe for many 
potential military objectives, considering the power and precision of 
modern weaponry. In the sixteen major deployments of American 
military force since the Resolution became law, only five received ex-
plicit congressional approval.63 
 The executive branch did not publicly interpret its constitutional 
war powers until 2011, when the U.S. Department of Justice released 
a memorandum in anticipation of the Obama Administration‟s inter-
vention in Libya.64 It asserted the President‟s independent authority 
and obligation to determine and pursue American national security 
interests, derived from the executive‟s commander-in-chief power and 
Supreme Court precedent since Curtiss-Wright.65 It also recognized a 
need for legislative authorization but only in the case of “prolonged 
and substantial military engagements, typically involving exposure 
of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial peri-
od.”66 The memo concluded that the Libyan operation did not rise to a 
level requiring approval from Congress.67 The United States‟ inter-
vention in Libya ultimately exceeded the War Powers Resolution‟s 
sixty-day benchmark without a formal challenge.68 
 In essence, then, the executive‟s current position is that limits on 
its own military powers are to be primarily self-imposed. Congress 
has not effectively challenged that assertion, although it has the con-
stitutional authority to do so. 
                                                                                                                  
 63. The two conflicts in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan were preceded by explicit 
approval; whereas Lebanon and Somalia received approval after the fact. CURTIS A. 
BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 268 (4th 
ed. 2011). 
 64. Caroline D. Krass, Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, DEP‟T OF JUSTICE 
(Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/04/31/authority-
military-use-in-libya.pdf. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 8. Similarly, State Department Legal Adviser, Harold Koh, testified before 
Congress that the Obama Administration interpreted the War Powers Resolution to apply 
to expansive conflicts, such as the one in Vietnam, not to smaller operations like Libya that 
were comparatively limited in means, objectives, risk to service members, and potential for 
escalation. Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 112th 
Cong. (2011) (statement of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep‟t of State), availa-
ble at www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/167250.htm. 
 67. Krass, supra note 64, at 14. 
 68. David A. Fahrenthold, Obama Misses Deadline for Congressional Approval of Lib-
ya Operations, WASH. POST (May 20, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/obama-
likely-to-miss-deadline-for-congressional-approval-of-libya-operations/2011/05/19/AFFLKn7G_ 
story.html. 
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B.   The War on Terrorism 
 The interbranch dynamic described thus far provides an essential 
backdrop for the focus of modern national security policy on combat-
ing terrorism. Initial counterterrorism efforts in the 1980s consisted 
of intelligence operations that targeted specific terrorist groups and 
undermined their political goals through infiltration and misinfor-
mation.69 This approach proved well-suited to groups with specific 
political agendas, but it was a much less effective strategy against al-
Qaeda, which emerged as a threat during the 1990s.70 The scale of 
the attacks on September 11, 2001, the repeated targeting of United 
States‟ military resources and financial center, and al-Qaeda‟s decla-
rations of holy war against Western civilization led President George 
W. Bush to conclude that America had been attacked, not by a fringe 
criminal group, but by a military enemy.71 Not surprisingly, the war 
paradigm that subsequently dominated anti-terrorism policies en-
gendered an absolutist approach to terrorism that is now perpetuated 
by all three branches of government. 
 1.   Statutory Authority for Absolutist Antiterrorism Policies 
 The first major sign of the absolutist approach is evident, not in 
executive action, but in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a response to recent acts of international 
and domestic terrorism, including the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing and the Oklahoma City bombing. Title III of AEDPA aims 
to maximize the financial isolation of terrorist groups and is based, 
in part, on the finding that “foreign organizations that engage in 
terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”72 Due 
to concerns about terrorist groups raising money in the United 
States “under the cloak of a humanitarian or charitable exercise,”73 
AEDPA makes it a criminal offense to provide “material support” to 
                                                                                                                  
 69. Interview: Bob Woodward, Target America, FRONTLINE, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/ 
frontline/shows/target/interviews/woodward.html (last visited Feb. 11 2015); see also Timo-
thy Naftali, U.S. Counterterrorism before Bin Laden, 60 INT‟L J. 25 (2004-05); Lessons 
Learned from the 1980s, Target America, FRONTLINE, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ 
shows/target/etc/lessons.html (last visited Feb. 11 2015); Terrorist Attacks on Americans, 
1979-1988, Target America, FRONTLINE, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/target/ 
etc/cron.html (last visited Feb. 11 2015). 
 70. Naftali, supra note 69.  
 71. Interviews show that the administration understood the United States to be at 
war before the last of the four planes, Flight 93, had crashed in Pennsylvania. See general-
ly BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 15-18 (2002). 
 72. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1247 
(1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.). 
 73. H.R. REP. NO. 104-383, at 43 (1995). 
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a designated foreign terrorist organization. The current statutory 
language reads: 
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a 
foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 
years, or both, and, if the death of any person results, shall be im-
prisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this paragraph, 
the person must have knowledge that the organization is a desig-
nated terrorist organization . . . , that the organization has en-
gaged or engages in terrorist activity . . . , or that the organization 
has engaged or engages in terrorism.74  
 Some commentators believe the material support offense is a 
“catch-all” way to give the government room to adapt its terror prose-
cutions to new iterations of the threat as they emerge.75 If so, then its 
inclusion was prescient in light of the attack on September 11, 2001, 
after which the little-utilized provision quickly became “the center-
piece of the Justice Department‟s criminal war on terrorism,” despite 
targeting non-violent activities.76 The statutory terms not only allow 
for a broad reading of “material assistance,” but also give a central and 
nearly unimpeachable role to the State Department‟s expansive defini-
tion of terrorism.77 The ability to bring a legal challenge to a terrorist 
designation is quite circumscribed under this statute, and the parties 
that have done so have been “almost uniformly unsuccessful.”78 
 In 2010, the Supreme Court upheld the broadest possible interpre-
tation of the “material support” offense in Holder v. Humanitarian 
Law Project.79 In that case, plaintiffs were individuals and groups 
whose work involved teaching and advocating the use of internation-
al law and other nonviolent means to reduce conflict, advance human 
rights, and promote peace.80 They raised two First Amendment chal-
                                                                                                                  
 74. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012). 
 75. Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived 
from the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT‟L SEC. L. & POL‟Y 5, 7 (2005). 
 76. DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 75-76 (2003). 
 77. Being a non-state actor who engages in political violence is sufficient. See In re S-
K-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 936, 948 (BIA 2006) (“Any group that has used a weapon for any pur-
pose other than for personal monetary gain can, under this statute, be labeled a terrorist 
organization.”). 
 78. Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 
543, 558-60 (2011). A terrorist group does not receive notice of its designation and has thir-
ty days to challenge it in court subsequent to publication in the Federal Register; it will 
only be reversed on a judicial finding that it was arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of  
discretion. Id. 
 79. 561 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 80. See id. at 10. 
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lenges to the government‟s interpretation of the material support 
prohibition, which criminalized their activities. 81  Noting that the 
statute defines “material support” to include “training,” “expert ad-
vice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel,” the Court rejected 
their claims. 82  Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts 
acknowledged congressional and executive findings and also inde-
pendently endorsed the view that even support not related to violence 
“helps lend legitimacy to foreign terrorist groups—legitimacy that 
makes it easier for those groups to persist, to recruit members, and to 
raise funds—all of which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”83 
 The other key piece of legislation in the U.S. legal framework for 
antiterrorism is the Authorization of Military Force (AUMF), passed 
on September 18, 2001, which gave legislative endorsement to the 
American military operations in Afghanistan that would begin the 
following month. The authorization provides: 
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he deter-
mines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist at-
tacks that occurred on September 11th, 2001, or harbored such or-
ganizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of in-
ternational terrorism against the United States by such nations, 
organizations or persons.84 
This language gave the Bush Administration wide latitude to adapt 
traditional conventions of war conduct to an unconventional adver-
sary. By now, the implications are familiar: framing U.S. military 
action against al-Qaeda as a war allowed the United States to treat 
members of the group as enemy combatants under international hu-
manitarian law. Whereas criminals are entitled to due process and 
cannot be killed by law enforcement unless they pose an imminent 
threat of death or serious bodily injury, active militants in a violent 
conflict can be killed without warning or detained without charge 
while hostilities continue.85 
                                                                                                                  
 81. Id. at 10-11. 
 82. Id. at 14. 
 83. Holder, 561 U.S. at 30. The Chief Justice did not mention Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444 (1969), which ordinarily sets an extremely high standard for government 
infringement on the freedom of speech. See also Hedges v. Obama, 890 F. Supp. 2d 424 
(S.D.N.Y. 2012), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1936 (2014) (American journalists and activists 
sued to enjoin the government from detaining them as enemy combatants in the event that 
their work would bring them into contact with designated terrorists). 
 84. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) 
(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2012)). 
 85. See U.N. Charter art. 51; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Hague Convention with Respect to the Laws 
and Customs of War on Land, art. 26, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803. 
2014]  BALANCING NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 269 
 
 2.   Targeted Killing 
 The Obama Administration has expanded the legal principles de-
scribed above to make targeted killing the foundation of U.S. antiter-
rorism. 86  Drone strikes increased sixfold after 2009. 87  Though the 
strikes mostly targeted Taliban fighters in Pakistan,88 the focus has 
recently shifted toward Yemen and (again) Iraq, with Somalia, Mali, 
and other weak African states on the horizon.89 The withdrawal of 
U.S. ground troops from Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that Ameri-
ca‟s various national security agencies are institutionalizing targeted 
killing policies for long-term use.90  
 President Obama has attempted to provide transparency regard-
ing the process that his Administration uses to “nominate” drone tar-
gets. A diverse group of national security officials coordinated to cre-
ate a “disposition matrix” that contains information about targets 
and the feasibility of killing them by drone strikes or other meth-
ods.91 When the matrix suggests a good candidate for a drone strike, 
the group passes that information up through the President‟s Na-
tional Security Council.92 President Obama personally approves every 
name and about one-third of the total strikes.93 But not every strike 
targets particular individuals. Drone operations also include “signa-
ture strikes” on targets whose identities are unknown, but who intel-
ligence shows engaging in “suspicious behavior.”94 
                                                                                                                  
 86. See Scott Shane, Targeted Killing Comes to Define War on Terror, N.Y. TIMES 
(Apr. 7, 2013), www.nytimes.com/2013/04/08/world/targeted-killing-comes-to-define-war-
on-terror.html. 
 87. See Peter Bergen & Megan Braun, Drone is Obama‘s Weapon of Choice, CNN 
(Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/opinion/bergen-obama-drone/. 
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 89. See Tracking America‘s Drone War, WASH. POST, http://apps.washingtonpost.com/ 
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 93. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret ‗Kill List‘ Proves a Test of Obama‘s Principles and 
Will, N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-
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 94. Miller, supra note 90; Greg Miller, CIA Seeks New Authority to Expand Yemen 
Drone Campaign, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
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 By all accounts, the drones have been extremely successful at kill-
ing individuals who the government believes are associated with ter-
rorist organizations, and more precise targeting appears to have 
dramatically reduced collateral damage under the Obama 
Administration.95 This success has had two positive effects: (1) over-
whelming domestic, public approval of the drone campaign, and (2) a 
significant reduction in the number of strikes.96 But despite its ap-
parent effectiveness, the legal foundations of this counterterrorism 
strategy impose few, if any, requirements of transparency and ac-
countability on the executive branch. 
 The Obama Administration‟s position is that targeted killing is 
legal under three conditions: (1) the target poses an imminent threat 
of violent attack against the United States, (2) capture is not feasible, 
and (3) the operation is conducted in accordance with applicable laws 
of war.97 According to former Attorney General Eric Holder, if the ex-
ecutive concludes that these three conditions are met, then the exec-
utive‟s deliberations will be enough to satisfy due process rights of 
suspected terrorists.98 There is no obligation to prove or defend the 
conclusion in a judicial proceeding.99 Accordingly, the government has 
not explained, for example, the risk assessments that determine 
whether capture is feasible,100 or how an apparently exhaustive ad-
ministrative deliberation can be squared with the concept of an “im-
minent” threat. News reports indicate that abuses of this discretion-
                                                                                                                  
world/national-security/cia-seeks-new-authority-to-expand-yemen-drone-campaign/2012/ 
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 98. Holder, supra note 97. 
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leib, The Killing of bin Laden: Was It Legal?, CNN (May 6, 2011), www.cnn.com/2011/ 
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ary power are already taking place, such as a presumption that all 
military-aged men in the vicinity of known terrorist activities are en-
emy combatants.101 
 Both the Obama Administration and Congress seem to realize 
that targeted killing, without effective oversight, lays a foundation 
for abuse of executive power—if not by the Obama Administration 
itself, then by its successors. As the 2012 election drew near, the 
Obama Administration‟s officials hurried to assemble a rulebook ar-
ticulating legal standards for targeted killings in the event that a 
new President will control those operations.102 In addition, members 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee have tried to exercise 
more oversight over drone strikes. At the Committee‟s insistence, 
each month, the Central Intelligence Agency privately screens videos 
of its recent drone strikes with its members (or, more commonly, 
their high-level aides), and it also shares a summary of the intelli-
gence that motivated the attacks.103 
 However, as of early 2013, some members of the Committee still 
reported having only limited access to classified information about 
the strikes and their legal bases. In February, Senator Dianne Fein-
stein (D-CA) said that “[r]ight now it is very hard [to oversee] be-
cause it is regarded as a covert activity, so when you see something 
that is wrong and you ask to be able to address it, you are told no.”104 
In March, Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) said that he was still unable to 
provide adequate legal oversight of drone strikes, because he still had 
not been given—presumably by the Obama Administration—
manageable legal standards for evaluating their legitimacy.105 
C.   The Inevitable Absolutism of the Executive‘s Duty to Defend 
 The proposition that executives are likely to take an expansive 
view of their own legal authority was the primary fear that motivated 
the constitutional Framers to devise a government constrained by 
                                                                                                                  
 101. Becker & Shane, supra note 93. 
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checks and balances. Before Harold Koh became the State Depart-
ment‟s Legal Adviser under President Obama, he was a law professor 
known for advocating a “new national security charter.”106 Years be-
fore Americans heard of al-Qaeda, Koh advocated for “attacking the 
institutional sources of congressional acquiescence and judicial toler-
ance that have contributed equally to recent executive excesses.”107 In 
a 1991 panel discussion, he noted, “Each of the three branches has an 
incentive to behave in a way which makes the system as a whole 
work poorly. The Executive Branch has an incentive to act or to over-
reach; Congress has an incentive to defer; the courts have an incen-
tive to duck the hard cases.”108 
 Similarly addressing executive overreach, Henry P. Monaghan 
noted the enormous public expectations that have developed around 
the Office of the President, pointing to the vast number of legal areas 
for which Americans hold presidents responsible and the speed with 
which they must deal with issues of law enforcement.109 Executives 
recognize that they, not members of Congress, will be held accounta-
ble for successful terrorist attacks. Under such pressures, Monaghan 
explains, “it is not surprising that „law‟ of any kind (the Constitution 
included) can easily become merely one more factor to be considered, 
or even an obstacle to be overcome.”110  
 Legal tolerance for executive dominance may also be perpetuated 
by a common perception that presidents and other executive officials 
have other, less formal incentives to exercise restraint on their own 
power; in the context of counterterrorism, these might include the 
costs and risks of military operations and the desire for professional 
advancement. 111  President Obama portrays his own philosophical 
values and governing objectives as limits on his actions, and he fre-
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quently acknowledges the need for oversight.112 If the executive ap-
pears to be limited in practice, then the need for formal constraints 
may not seem particularly pressing. 
 In light of the permissive attitude of Congress and the courts, the 
demands of the presidency, and institutional executive advantages in 
the realm of foreign policy, it should come as no surprise that presi-
dents from both parties have responded to the unprecedented and 
difficult threat of global terrorism by invoking the most deferential 
legal standards possible: those that apply in times of war.113 But once 
adopted, the war paradigm, with its life-or-death stakes, is inherent-
ly absolutist. In addition, terrorists, by specifically targeting civil-
ians, are especially likely to inspire extremely risk-averse policies 
that crowd out more nuanced alternatives. 
 Nevertheless, most academic work in the context of terrorism con-
cludes that even if Congress can escape political responsibility for 
failing to address the threat, there is no compelling legal justification 
for its abdication of oversight in this area.114 Robert Bejesky charac-
terizes the judiciary‟s reluctance to arbitrate competing views of war-
making authority—despite relative academic consensus on a shared-
power model—as a legal void, naturally filled by the executive‟s ex-
pansive understanding of its own power.115 Congress has likewise left 
its policy void with respect to the broad American objective of reduc-
ing global terrorism, as members of Congress look to the Obama Ad-
ministration to tell them the legal basis for drone attacks, rather 
than vice versa. 
III.   THE COSTS OF ABSOLUTIST ANTITERRORISM POLICIES 
 The previous section established that current antiterrorism poli-
cies are subject to disturbingly few formal legal constraints and ar-
gued that this permissive framework inevitably leads to an absolutist 
view of terrorism. While only a minority of Americans may currently 
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perceive the consequences of executive dominance in this area, the 
following discussion offers a broad sample of the consequences of ab-
solutism and explains why legislative checks are needed. 
A.   Contraction of Domestic Civil Liberties 
 Executive dominance in the realm of national security has en-
croached on individual rights to due process, counsel, and privacy 
against unreasonable searches. First, the Obama Administration has 
claimed the authority to target American citizens with drone strikes 
if they pose an imminent threat to the United States.116 When the 
father of such an American target, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, sued the Obama 
Administration on his son‟s behalf for injunctive relief from assassi-
nation, a federal court held that the question of whether the govern-
ment could kill Al-Aulaqi “without charge, trial, or conviction” was a 
“political question” and, thus, was non-justiciable.117 The court rea-
soned that deciding the issue would bleed into foreign policymaking 
for which the court had neither the authority nor the expertise.118 Al-
Aulaqi was killed by drone in Yemen the following year.119 Respond-
ing to congressional requests to explain to Americans the circum-
stances under which “their government believes that it is allowed to 
kill them,”120 President Obama said that targeted killing is a tactic 
for U.S. military operations against al-Qaeda authorized by the 
AUMF, regardless of the target‟s nationality.121 
 Second, the war on terrorism has involved extensive use of “indef-
inite detention.” In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, a plurality of the Supreme 
Court held that some process is still due to Americans whom the 
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Commander-in-Chief classifies as “enemy combatants.”122 However, 
Justice O‟Connor‟s plurality opinion concluded that detention of en-
emy combatants—which, according to international law, is a “funda-
mental incident” to waging war—was legitimate while hostilities con-
tinued.123 This holding did not reconcile the Court‟s rejection of indef-
inite detention with the perpetual nature of “hostilities” against non-
state terrorist groups. The Court subsequently declined to review a 
D.C. Circuit decision regarding whether hostilities were continuing 
on the grounds that such an issue required a “political decision.”124 
The Court in Boumediene v. Bush rejected actions by both the execu-
tive and Congress when it upheld both the executive and Congress by 
upholding an American detainee‟s right to petition for a writ of habe-
as corpus.125 But despite the decision in Boumediene and a Guan-
tanamo Review Task Force that has cleared some detainees for re-
lease, many detainees remain in custody without charge pursuant to 
an executive moratorium on the release of Yemenis.126 
 Third, the Obama Administration has recently expanded the use 
of a “public safety” exception127 to arrestees‟ rights to remain silent 
under Miranda v. Arizona.128 In 2011, the Department of Justice 
instructed the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): “There may 
be exceptional cases in which, although all relevant public safety 
questions have been asked, agents nonetheless conclude that con-
tinued unwarned interrogation is necessary to collect valuable and 
timely intelligence not related to any immediate threat.”129 The De-
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partment‟s approach to interrogating Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, one of 
the alleged 2013 Boston Marathon bombers, suggests that this rule 
is the new standard for Miranda warnings.130 President Obama al-
most immediately identified the attack as an act of terrorism, and a 
Justice Department official said that Tsarnaev‟s interrogators 
would invoke the public safety exception as long as needed to gain 
“critical intelligence.”131 
 Finally, confidential documents recently leaked by a contractor for 
the National Security Agency revealed that the Agency has been op-
erating a number of programs that allow the federal government to 
access and search data related to millions of Americans‟ phone and 
Internet usage, compiled by corporations such as Verizon Wireless, 
Apple, Google, and Facebook. 132  These companies are sometimes 
compelled by U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISA 
Court) orders,133 which were top secret until one of them was leaked 
in 2013,134 to turn over the user data that they routinely collect when 
a court finds that government access is justified under 50 
U.S.C. § 1851. 135  The leaked FISA Court order, for example, com-
pelled Verizon to turn over “all call detail records or „telephony 
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GUARDIAN (June 5, 2013, 7:04 PM), www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/ 
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eign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation; or (iii) an indi-
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metadata‟ created by Verizon for communications (i) between the 
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United States, 
including local telephone calls.”136 
 President Obama, defending the Agency‟s search programs, said: 
“You can‟t have 100 percent security and also then have 100 percent 
privacy and 0 percent inconvenience. . . . We‟re going to have to make 
some choices as a country. What you can say is, in evaluating these 
programs, they make a difference to anticipate and prevent possible 
terrorist activity.”137 The President also observed that in light of leg-
islative and judicial oversight of these programs, it is problematic if 
Americans do not trust the government‟s fundamental system of 
checks and balances.138 
B.   Compromised Foreign Policy Goals 
 Because members of violent organizations do not necessarily iso-
late themselves from civilian areas and may even attempt to carry 
out some basic governing functions, people with no intent to commit 
violence (e.g., family members, housekeepers, drivers, doctors, jour-
nalists) may nevertheless become linked to terrorists through social 
connections or economic dependence. An absolutist approach to ter-
rorism severely disadvantages these individuals and places signifi-
cant constraints on other U.S. foreign policy objectives, such as public 
diplomacy, refugee relief, and economic development. 
 For example, drone strikes in Pakistan and Yemen are inflicting 
collateral damage that generates hatred of the U.S. government 
among local populations. Although the Pakistan drone campaign is 
classified, most sources report that strikes in Pakistan peaked in 
2010, with about 120 strikes killing between 411 and 884 civilians 
(including 168 to 197 children) and injuring between 1177 and 
1480.139 The Pakistani government, which shares the goal of elimi-
                                                                                                                  
 136. Secondary Order In re Application of the Fed, Bureau of Investigation for an Or-
der Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., (FISA 
Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-
telephone-data-court-order. 
 137. Philip Ewing, NSA Memo Pushed to ―Rethink‖ 4th Amendment, POLITICO (June 7, 
2013, 2:21 PM), www.politico.com/story/2013/06/nsa-memo-4th-amendment-92416.html. 
 138. See id. 
 139. Jack Serle & Chris Woods, March 2013 Update: US Covert Actions in Pakistan, 
Yemen and Somalia, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Apr. 2, 2013), 
www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/04/02/march-2013-update-us-covert-actions-in-pakistan-
yemen-and-somalia/. CBS news gives similar figures. Elizabeth Palmer, Angry Pakistanis 
Fight to End U.S. Drone Strikes, CBS NEWS (May 23, 2013, 7:42 PM), 
www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57586008/angry-pakistanis-fight-to-end-u.s-drone-strikes/. 
The New America Foundation puts the number of civilian fatalities closer to 300, but some 
doubt this estimate. Conor Friedersdorf, Flawed Analysis of Drone Strike Data is Mislead-
 
278  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:255 
 
nating al-Qaeda and Taliban presence, must now respond to public 
outcry against the strikes. In April 2013, a Pakistani court said that 
the strikes were illegal;140 and in June, Nawaz Sharif, a staunch op-
ponent of the drone strikes, became Pakistan‟s new prime minister.141 
The new Pakistani government has reportedly lodged an official pro-
test with the American delegation to end the strikes, saying they are 
inspiring anti-American sentiment among the public, thus undermin-
ing the relationship between the two countries.142 
 Though the United States has struck Yemeni targets less fre-
quently, some of the most highly publicized civilian casualties have 
occurred there, and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism reports 
up to 49 civilian fatalities and 144 injuries as of 2013.143 In April 
2013, at a subcommittee hearing for the Senate Judiciary Committee, 
legislators heard testimony from Farea Al-Muslimi, a Yemeni activist 
who advocates for better relations with the United States.144 He re-
ported that the strikes were undermining the Yemeni government, 
inspiring resentment of the United States, and giving more legitima-
cy to al-Qaeda groups in the region.145 “What radicals had previously 
failed to achieve in my village, one drone strike accomplished in an 
instant: there is now an intense anger and growing hatred of Ameri-
ca,” Al-Muslimi said.146 
 A second policy area affected by the absolutist approach is politi-
cal asylum. The legal burden to prove political persecution is high;147 
however, even if refugees do not qualify for asylum status, U.S. and 
international law prohibits their return (“refoulement”) to countries 
where their life or freedom would be threatened based on their race, 
religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership in a particular 
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social group.148 On the other hand, current immigration laws create a 
complete bar to asylum if the applicant has “engaged in terrorism,” 
which includes providing material support to terrorist organiza-
tions.149 A terrorist organization is a group of two or more individu-
als, whether organized or not, which engages in any activity that is 
unlawful involving explosives, firearms, or any other dangerous de-
vice with intent to endanger one or more individuals or to cause sub-
stantial damage to property.150  There are no statutory exceptions 
based on knowledge or duress.151 Although the Board of Immigration 
Appeals has developed a basic mens rea requirement in its rulings, 
and the Department of Homeland Security can grant waivers at its 
discretion, recent scholarship indicates that these remedies are not 
reliable.152 By sending such people back to danger, the United States 
undermines the goals of its asylum policy and may also violate inter-
national standards for refoulement. 
 A third foreign policy area compromised by absolutist antiterror-
ism is humanitarian aid to promote economic development. In 2009, 
an extreme drought in the Horn of Africa led to a famine that put 3.7 
million people, mostly in southern Somalia, “in crisis.”153 But an al-
Qaeda-controlled Somali terrorist organization called al Shabaab, 
substantially prevented aid groups from delivering food154 and de-
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manded payments in exchange for access to starving populations.155 
Relief workers, including some who worked for the U.S. government, 
feared criminal prosecution for material support under federal law in 
the event that money, food, or other resources inevitably found their 
way to al Shabaab.156 The famine worsened for two years before the 
U.S. Department of Treasury‟s Enforcement Office agreed not to pur-
sue “support” delivered “in good faith” to Somalia through the State 
Department.157 It also stated that food assistance was “not a focus” of 
agency enforcement action,158 but that any other person or group giv-
ing money to anyone in Somalia “should be extremely cautious.”159 
 The Obama Administration‟s slow response to the worst famine in 
sixty years led to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, af-
ter which Congress directed the implicated agencies to evaluate their 
processes.160  But administrative reassessment alone is unlikely to 
address the underlying policy dilemma: an absolute commitment to 
eradicating terrorists often means also punishing non-terrorists in a 
way that can generate political instability and anti-American senti-
ment, thereby actually strengthening the roots of terrorism. The 
United States is likely to invest in Somalia‟s political environment for 
the foreseeable future; in the meantime, al-Qaeda affiliates continue 
to build strongholds wherever effective government is absent, abus-
                                                                                                                  
Al-Shabaab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 5, 2014), www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabaab/p18650; 
Somalia Profile: Timeline, BBC NEWS: AFRICA, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094632 
(July 16, 2014, 10:25 AM); Rob Wise, Al Shabaab, CENT. FOR STRATEGIC & INT‟L STUDS., 
July 2011, available at csis.org/files/publication/110715_Wise_AlShabaab_AQAM% 
20Futures%20Case%20Study_WEB.pdf. 
 155. Mark Tran, Al-Shabaab in Somalia Exploited Aid Agencies During 2011 Famine – 
Report, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-
development/2013/dec/09/al-shabaab-somalia-exploited-aid-agencies-famine. See Clar Ni 
Chonghaile, Al-Shabaab Bans Aid Agencies in Somalia and Raids Offices, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 28, 2011, 7:21 AM), www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/nov/28/al-shabaab-bans-aid-
agencies-somalia. 
 156. Jeffrey Gettleman, U.S. Delays Somalia Aid, Fearing It Is Feeding Terrorists, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 2, 2009), www.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/world/africa/02somalia.html?_r=0. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Office of Foreign Assets Control, Frequently Asked Questions and Answers: Ques-
tions Regarding Private Relief Efforts in Somalia [hereinafter Frequently Asked Q&As], 
U.S. DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY (Oct. 10, 2014, 11:20 AM), www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/answer.aspx#som; see also OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS 
CONTROL, U.S. DEP‟T OF THE TREASURY, SOMALIA SANCTIONS PROGRAM (2010), available at 
www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Documents/somalia.pdf. 
 159. Frequently Asked Q&As, supra note 158. 
 160. Responding to Drought and Famine in the Horn of Africa: Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. (2011), available at www.foreign.senate.gov/ 
hearings/responding-to-drought-and-famine-in-the-horn-of-africa. This concern is also ar-
ticulated in the recent Senate report regarding the Appropriations Bill (S. 3241). U.S. 
DEP‟T OF STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND RELATED PROGRAMS APPROPRIATIONS BILL, 
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ing local populations in the process.161 The Somalia dilemma will al-
most certainly recur, forcing the United States to make difficult, sub-
jective, and fact-specific choices between waging war on terrorists 
and promoting social stability and prosperity. But the policy nuance 
and flexibility that such choices require is being crowded out by the 
executive branch‟s predictably extreme, and virtually unchecked, re-
liance on the use of coercive power to eliminate terrorist threats. 
IV.   ASSERTING A CONGRESSIONAL CHECK ON 
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY 
 In traditional wars, threats could be reduced with the exercise of 
superior military force, and the model of a Commander-in-Chief 
simply executing a war declared by Congress was less problematic. 
But most political violence since World War II has taken the form of 
civil conflict and often involves non-governmental entities.162 Despite 
the short-term successes of the United States‟ counterterrorism tac-
tics, no one expects terrorism to disappear as a significant threat in 
the foreseeable future. Bruce Riedel, a counterterrorism adviser to 
President Obama, illustrated the futility of drone strikes as a long-
term strategy: “You‟ve got to mow the lawn all the time. The minute 
you stop mowing, the grass is going to grow back.”163 Because the na-
ture of armed conflict has changed, laws based on a traditional state-
to-state model of conflict—including U.S. constitutional war powers—
are already becoming obsolete, thus creating space for new conven-
tions to take their place. The rapid evolution of weapons and warfare 
also favors executive expertise, intelligence resources, and quick re-
sponse time. 
 Under these conditions, Congress will have to fight for any influ-
ence it wishes to have over the nation‟s foreign policy. But it has tools 
to do so: the Constitution provides clear authority for the legislature 
to set foreign policy objectives, including parameters for military ac-
tions against terrorists. Congress can do this by reforming three key 
statutes that currently define the legal framework of U.S. foreign pol-
icy: AUMF, the prohibition on providing material support to terrorist 
groups, and the Foreign Assistance Act. 
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 In light of how the contours of the war on terror have changed 
since 2001, Congress should repeal AUMF and replace it with legisla-
tion that more specifically identifies America‟s enemies. The new au-
thorization statute should codify requirements for targeted killing 
that provide manageable judicial standards for determining whether 
executive action is authorized. It should also increase transparency 
surrounding drone strikes by prohibiting their use in covert opera-
tions and requiring their results to be reported publicly. 
 After Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, the prohibition on 
providing material support to terrorist groups should be a specific 
intent crime in which the perpetrator‟s purpose must be to contribute 
to violent activities or to promote the stated goals of the terrorist or-
ganization. The prohibition should exclude groups who seek to un-
dermine terrorism through socialization (e.g., doctors, teachers, and 
journalists). At the very least, the prohibition should exclude interac-
tions that actively seek to discourage a terrorist group‟s violence. 
 Congress should also direct the Departments of State and Home-
land Security to develop rules that: (1) assess the humanitarian im-
pact of any antiterrorism policy; and (2) set special enforcement pri-
orities in dire humanitarian circumstances, such as natural disaster. 
These procedures should allow relaxed enforcement in cases of an 
emergency, like famine, that may call for a temporary rebalancing of 
priorities. Congress should also direct the State Department to com-
pile an annual list of neutral aid agencies to be granted immunity 
under the material support prohibition.164 
 Finally, Congress must revisit its foreign assistance framework if 
economic development is to be an effective complement to counterter-
rorism. In an unprecedented conceptual merger of strategic, ideologi-
cal, and humanitarian interests after the horror of September 11, 
2001, policymakers acknowledged global poverty as a threat to na-
tional security—terrorists can operate most effectively in societies 
with weak governments, and they can exploit the anger and despera-
tion of poor populations.165 Yet foreign assistance is profoundly un-
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dermined by development programs‟ reputation for inefficiency and 
lack of accountability, which has engendered strong legislative mis-
trust.166 Global non-governmental organizations are seen by some as 
inadequate, at best, and self-serving, at worst.167 
 To address these concerns, a congressional roundtable spent three 
years drafting a proposed replacement of the fifty-year-old Foreign 
Assistance Act.168 The new legislation seeks to improve efficiency and 
accountability through modernized reporting practices, information 
sharing between agencies, decentralized aid that utilizes local re-
sources, and frequent re-evaluation of basic objectives and strategies 
to adjust to rapidly changing circumstances.169 The bill also makes 
specific reforms to emergency and disaster assistance programs, gen-
erally prioritizing global food security in development programs and 
implementing better advance planning for emergency aid to reduce 
inefficiency caused by haste.170 Although a thorough analysis of the 
Global Partnerships Act is well beyond the scope of this Comment, I 
suggest only that if legislators wish to decrease the need for military 
counterterrorism, they should continue these efforts to make badly-
needed changes to U.S. foreign assistance. 
V.   CONCLUSION 
 Entrenched congressional and judicial deference to the executive 
branch in matters of national security has predictably led to an abso-
lutist approach to combating global terrorism. This approach is im-
plemented in a way that encroaches on American civil liberties and 
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undermines the broader goal of supporting stable and prosperous so-
cieties around the world. While reasonable people may differ on the 
correct balance between security and liberty, the foregoing analysis 
demonstrates that legal restraints on the executive in this area are 
not particularly apparent. When the war paradigm persists with no 
end in sight, actions that may have once represented the outer 
bounds of legality can become normal standards. President Obama 
correctly acknowledges that the United States, as a society, should 
engage in a profound debate about the tradeoffs at stake in the war 
on terror. However, that debate should take place, not only among 
members of the public and the press, but also between the political 
branches in the adversarial system that the constitutional Framers 
envisioned. 
